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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
GENERATING ALTERNATIVES: THE POSSIBLE ENERGY TRANSITIONS FOR
FRANCE AND GERMANY AFTER THE PARIS ACCORD
by
Anna Fache
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Mahadev G. Bhat, Major Professor
Following the Paris Accord of 2015, multiple countries, including France and
Germany, promised to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in order to slow down
climate change. Current energy production and consumption patterns do not allow for
such targets. Meeting these emission reduction goals requires a transition in energy
production. Energy transitions can be inefficient and costly if not planned properly, and
multiple constraints need to be taken into account when putting such a process in place.
The model proposed in the present study aims to find the most cost-effective energy
portfolios for France and Germany, two highly industrialized nations in Europe. The
model consists of national total energy production cost function and characterizes least
cost pathway to supply energy while meeting the greenhouse gas emission targets until
2030. This model can be applied to other nations and regions of the world. The current
research also conducts various scenario simulations to observe how different changes,
such as GHG constraints or demand variation can affect the energy sector in the future.
It is found that meeting GHG emission targets for both countries is financially feasible,
and could be met through a reduction in overall energy demand as well as making a
partial shift towards low- carbon renewable energy sources.
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 Introduction
The Industrial Revolution promoted the emergence of mechanization and set the
industrial sector as the new foundation the economic structure of society, instead of
agriculture. The massive coal extraction coupled with the invention of the steam engine
provided a new energy that gave the first push to the entire process through the
development of rail networks and the acceleration of economic, human and material
exchanges. Since the Industrial Revolution, we have been relying on non-renewable
energy sources such as coal and oil. The use of such resources allowed for a quick
economic development, as well as an increase in the standard of living in most countries.
However, these resources are limited in time and place, and have negative impacts on the
environment, such as the release of greenhouse gas emissions.
While a small amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) is produced naturally, the
majority is emitted by human activities. As McMichael points out in his study, humans
have been responsible for most of the global warming since 1950, with an increase in
global temperatures of +0.7 degrees Celsius. It is expected that temperatures will
continue to rise up to 1-2 degrees Celsius by 2050, and 3-4 degrees Celsius by 2100
(McMichael, 2013). The greenhouse effect is a phenomenon sensitive to changes in the
composition of the atmosphere. The increase in GHG emissions modifies the atmospheric
composition, causing an increase in the greenhouse effect. Such an imbalance causes a
global warming that modifies the climates. Massive use of fossil fuels (coal, gas, oil),
deforestation, intensive livestock and agriculture produce large amounts of GHGs that are
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concentrated in the atmosphere and trap heat (McMichael, 2013). Agriculture, by itself,
produces 52 and 84% of global anthropogenic methane and nitrous oxide emissions
(Smith, et al. 2007).
The extraction, transport and combustion of fossil fuels not only produce CO2,
but also other greenhouse gases, as well as the emission of particles. As the IPCC report
points out, the stabilization of GHG emission within the atmosphere, by limiting global
warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, will require reducing
emissions from energy, agricultural, transport and other sectors (Rogelj, et al. 2018), but
even by completely stopping our greenhouse gas emissions, the equilibrium would not be
restored rapidly since some greenhouse gases have a very long lifetime in the
atmosphere. Obviously, such a mode of living is neither sustainable nor equitable since
the less developed countries do not have access to the energy resources that wealthier
countries do, but still have to suffer the consequences of GHG emissions (Stern, 2006).
Over the last decades, increasing attention has been given to renewable energy as
a strategy for greenhouse gas reductions. However, the energy market is mainly
dominated by oil and gas, and renewables have a hard time becoming competitive.
Several international agreements were put in place through the years, such as the Kyoto
Protocol of 1997, in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Vasser, 2009). The initial
objective of the Kyoto Protocol was to achieve during the 2008-2012 commitment period
a reduction of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5% (in committed
countries) below the 1990 levels. Countries were separated into 2 groups: Annex 1
(developed countries) and Non-Annex 1 (developing countries). Annex 1 countries faced
emissions limitations, representing a GHG reduction of 61.6% in total. Judging the
success of the Kyoto protocol can bring mixed results: on one hand, countries did manage
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to reduce their GHG emissions, especially developed countries, but the way they did it
was not sustainable: first hit by the financial crisis, these countries managed to move their
high GHG emitting production to developing countries, therefore shifting these GHG
emissions. However, international negotiations have failed to produce another binding
agreement, but the Paris Conference on Climate change gave hope for the confection of
such an agreement.
The Paris Agreement of 2015 brought together countries from all around the
world, which recommitted to reducing emissions and therefore slowing down climate
change. Following the Paris Agreement, European nations, among other countries,
promised to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. France and Germany, the two leading
European nations, and have different energy portfolios. As Heinrichs and Markewitz
(2017) note, the German government is working towards reducing greenhouse gases by
40% by 2020 and 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. France, on its side, pledged
to reduce its carbon emissions by 27% from 2013 levels by 2028, and by 75% in 2050.
With heavy uses of oil, coal and gas (i.e., constituting 63% and 68% of the country’s total
energy budget of France and Germany, respectively), these two countries have to explore
alternative energy portfolios in order to meet their Paris Agreement targets.
An energy transition is an ecological goal that consists of a change from the
current energy system to a new energy system focused on renewable resources. Such a
transition mainly consists of reducing the consumption of fossil fuels in a large part of
human activities: industry, transport, lighting, but also improving efficiency of
technologies so that they emit less greenhouse gas emissions. Such an energy transition
would require studying our energy mix, which should not be confused with the electricity
mix. The energy mix corresponds to all the energy sources used to meet the energy needs
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of a country to move, heat, light, and operate our electrical equipment, etc, and an energy
mix only supplied by renewables is so far, not realistic (Kim and Park, 2018) The
electricity mix only concerns the energies used to produce electricity, and could on the
other hand be switched to renewables.
Although a transition to renewable energy may help these countries make
progress towards meeting the Paris Agreement targets, several economic, technological
and energy capacity questions confront such transition. These challenges are relevant for
both countries considered in the present study. Indeed, the price of energy resources, as
well as the cost to produce them will determine the share of this resource within the
portfolio. Additionally, its substitution by other energies will be important: for example,
oil does not have any viable large-scale competitor for the transportation sector, meaning
that countries like France have to import all their demand since they do not produce any.
Technology is another challenge all countries will have to face: not only they have to
make sure they have all infrastructure needed to produce energy, they also have to invest
in research towards energy efficiency, as well as energy storage. Lastly, the issue of
capacity is one that can also be linked to energy storage: not only countries have to make
sure they meet their demand, they also have to guarantee a constant and stable supply of
energy which can be challenging with the intermittence of some renewables. The main
goal of the research is to determine what kind of energy portfolios the above European
countries will possibly attain in the near- and medium-term future and whether such
transition will be within reasonable costs.
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1.2 Problem
Energy transitions are crucial for our future societies but can be difficult to put in
place and costly if not planned properly. Many factors need to be taken in account when
planning such a step, and realistic goals need to be put in place. Germany and France are
two of the largest economic players of Europe and have very different energy mixes.
Germany started investing in renewables prior to other countries, and France followed a
similar transition. However, both countries still rely heavily on non-renewables in order
to meet their energy demand: Germany on fossil fuels and France on nuclear heat. Both
countries are still heavily reliant on fossil fuels, especially oil, in order to meet their
transportation demands. Both countries have been focusing on reducing their GHG
emission levels, and so far, have been decreasing these numbers, but still have a long way
to go, especially Germany who has very ambitious targets. In order to meet their Paris
Accord targets, both countries will have to make major energy shifts from the current
scenario, which could have large cost and technological implications. Countries can
supply their demand thanks to domestic production but also imports if their territory does
not have the resources or infrastructures to produce a certain type of energy. Models are
a useful tool for scientists to project future scenarios, and in the case future of the present
research, costs and emissions as well. Indeed, previous studies such as Price and Keppo
(2017) have used models in order to explore the different possibilities and costs
implications of these possibilities. Models can also be used in order to estimate the cost
of carbon and the efficiency of the GHG targets proposed by the countries of choice for
this study.
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1.3 Research Questions
This research will address the following questions:
1. What is the actual share of energy today of France and Germany and what
are their patterns of use and production?
2. How would the energy portfolios (both in terms of renewable vs nonrenewable and domestic vs imported) of the two countries change as a
result of meeting their respective GHG reduction targets?
3. What are cost implications of meeting the emission targets?
4. How would costs and GHG emissions behave in a scenario without
demand and GHG constraints?
5. Are countries already at their cost optimal GHG targets?
1.4 Statement of Objectives
The main objectives of this research are to review the past and current energy
trends for both countries, including consumption, production, as well as imports.
Additionally, the present research will create a least-cost optimization model that takes
into consideration multiple constraints including greenhouse gas (GHG) emission
reduction targets, energy production capacity and energy demands, including specific
sectorial demand such as transportation. This project will also evaluate the effects of
committing to different greenhouse gas emission reduction scenarios at different slacks or
limits on total cost as well as on future energy supplies of France and Germany. Lastly,
the research will draw broad policy conclusion for making the energy transition smooth
and sustainable.

6

1.5 Significance of this Study
The study will propose energy shares for both countries derived from forecasted
demand and GHG targets. Such a study is significant because it could help countries plan
future shares bases on estimations, and also forecast future expenses in renewable energy
infrastructures. Additionally, the present study can be used for any nations that have the
data required to run the model and the need to characterize pathways of complex energy
mix that comply with global environmental standards.
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CHAPTER 2
2.1 Literature Review
Chapter 2 presents a literature review of the main concepts of the study as well as
previous work related to the topic. The chapter starts with a short review of the Paris
Accord. The next section will provide the role of France, Germany and Europe as whole
leaders of sustainable development. Following, a discussion about fossil fuels and their
limitations will be given. The next section will mention the challenges of an energy
transition, and the last section will discuss previous studies revolving around the subject
of modelling for energy transitions.
2.2 The Paris Accord
In 2015, 195 countries attended a Conference in Paris on climate change and
created the Paris Agreement. It took into account that putting extreme emission limits on
countries would not be successful and required countries to pledge to self-determined (or
nationally-determined) emission targets (Falkner, 2016). The goal of the agreement is to
avoid a rise in global temperature higher than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial
levels. In order to do so, four main points were highlighted:
1. The negotiation of a universal agreement, in accordance with Durban's mandate,
putting in place rules and mechanisms in order to gradually raise the motivation
of all signing nations to respect the limit of 2 ° C.
2. The presentation by all countries of their nationally determined contributions,
prior to COP21, in order to have scheduled goals and to demonstrate that all
States are advancing, according to their national opportunities, in the same
direction.
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3. The financial component will support developing countries and finance the
transition to low-carbon and resilient economies, before and after 2020.
4. Strengthening the commitments of civil society and non-state actors and multi
stakeholder initiatives of the Agenda of Solutions or Lima-Paris Action Plan, in
order to involve all actors and to initiate concrete actions without waiting the
entry into force of the future agreement in 2020.
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement includes both industrialized and
developing countries, and highlights the idea of “support for and international
cooperation on adaptation efforts” (Falkner, 2016). Another very important difference is
the fact the Paris agreement recognizes that no countries would be able to put in place
drastic measures to cut down greenhouse gas emissions, therefore adopting a more
realistic approach to the issue. As we all know, climate change is usually associated with
the combustion of fossil fuels such as oil, coal and gas, which has become the backbone
of the industrial economy. Therefore, Falkner believes that the idea of a decarbonization
of the economy would need to be supported by reengineering of the entire industrial
system, which can lead to political opposition and encounter practical challenges. Even
though some technology is already existing, replacing fossil fuels will be more difficult
than expected in some of the consumption sectors.

2.3 Energy Transition in Germany and France, and the Role of Europe as a Leader
Germany is not only one of the strongest economies in the world, but is also one
of the highest CO2 emitters, raising the question of sustainability and energy transition.
Renowned for being ahead in the field of renewable energy development, Germany is
often given as an example. In September 2010, the government published an ambitious
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energy roadmap called the "Energiekonzept" which supports the Energiewende project.
Among the main objectives was to reduce primary energy consumption and promote the
use of renewable resources (Steinbacher and Röhrkasten, 2019). The Fukushima accident
of 2011 acted as a trigger for Chancellor Angela Merkel, who decided to reconsider
Germany’s position on nuclear power and initiate a phase out by 2022 (Drmota, 2017).
Between 2000 and 2016, the country invested heavily in renewable energies in order to
launch an ambitious energy transition and manages to change its electricity production
portfolio. Germany also insisted on an international aspect of its transition by
encouraging energy partnerships between different countries. Even though the nation puts
forward these steps towards a cleaner energy mix, the reality is that its electricity
production is still heavily reliant on coal, and the transport sector on oil (Steinbacher,
Röhrkasten, 2019).
France sharply reduced its dependence on hydrocarbon imports after the 1973 oil
shock, by launching a vast nuclear power plant construction program. With the Kyoto
and Paris Accords, the country decided, as Germany, to take a leadership role when it
came to clean energy and put in place the 17th of August 2015, a law that would promote
an energy transition and sustainable development. The 2015 law sets strict targets for
energy consumption reduction, renovation of buildings, reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions, and even a reduction of nuclear energy. There is also a clear research and set
of action plans put in place in France and all over Europe in order to improve energy use
efficiency (Berghmans, 2017). Even though France has been increasing its share of
renewable energy, it is still unknown how the country will manage an important
reduction in nuclear energy knowing that it represents a large portion of the electricity
production mix. Some point out that such a phase out is not beneficial in the time period
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for the energy transition: what would actually replace nuclear power and guarantee that
all energy demand is met?
Welsch (2017) points out that the European Union is given the chance to be a
leader in terms of greenhouse gas emissions litigation, since it is the third largest the
emitter of greenhouse gas in the world, after the US and China. He also highlights the
fact that there should be a radical energy transformation of the energy sector since it is
such an important source of greenhouse gases. Even though each country will still use
fossil fuel he urges the fact that the electricity generation sector should be almost
completely decarbonized which will depend on the development of renewable energy‘s.
A think tank called Insight E was set up in order to join forces for a multidisciplinary
energy advice, not only to propose potential public policy actions but also to assess the
impact of political decisions. The group delivers a multitude of tools such as Rapid
Response Energy Briefs, which answer sharply current energy policy questions, Policy
Reports, which deeply analyze policy options and impacts, Hot Energy Topics, which are
topics brought up in anticipation of policy agendas and lastly an Observatory of the
Energy Transition in order to provide relevant and unbiased advice on energy transitions.
The European Union is fairly dependent on fossil fuels imports, which urges the
development of the renewable sector. Since the European Union decided to follow the
trend towards sustainable development, countries such as Germany or Denmark took the
lead. Even though fossil fuel powered generation represents most of the electricity of the
European Union, other modes of generation have been increasing in particular nuclear
power and Hydro power. Since the European Union is made up of the various countries it
can be challenging to harmonize market reforms which is why the Energy Union was
created in order to supply and support climate goals.
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2.4 Fossil Fuels and their Limits
Fossil energies are still very much used today in the world and two main issues
can arise with their consumption. The first is that their scarcity will create geopolitical
tensions in the world, on top of the fact that a small number of suppliers is in charge of
those resources (Rojey, 2009). The availability of reserves is an important source of
concern. At the current rate of consumption, oil is expected to be the first fossil fuel that
the world will run out off, followed by gas and coal. Regarding nuclear energy, the price
of uranium for operation of current reactors sets the consumption rate, and according to
the Global Nuclear Energy Report (2014) the current uranium reserves give 80 to 90
years of operation at the current rate of consumption. It may be that we still have these
energies a little longer because we rely on the proven reserves, that is to say the reserves
that we are sure to exploit. However, estimates are made to know the ultimate reserves
that could be discovered, thus increasing the operating life of the energy.
The second problem is that the CO2 emissions generated by fossil fuels are high
and contribute significantly to global warming. Indeed, GHG coefficients of oil, coal and
gas are the highest compared to other resources such as wind power, solar power or even
nuclear power (World Nuclear Association). Even though the climate change topic is full
of debate, we can still say that a global movement is emerging to face the new climate.
The energy "transition" is above all energy: it aims to free the world economy from its
dependence on fossil fuels, since by burning coal, oil and natural gas for their activities,
men release billions of tonnes of greenhouse gases every year, that accumulate in the
atmosphere and disrupt the climate.
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2.5 The Challenges of an Energy Transition
The concept of an energy transition is very appealing, however can be quite
difficult to put in place. Our civilization is heavily dependent on fossil fuels, resulting in
changes in land cover that emit high amounts of greenhouse gases, leading to increases in
average tropospheric temperature. By 2030, the world is expected to consume two
additional thirds of what is already consuming today and developing countries will
represent the highest proportion in this demand (Dorian, Franssen and Simbeck, 2006).
The previous authors identify four main challenges that arise with energy transitions:
increasing oil scarcity, promoting energy security, fighting environmental degradation
and finally meeting the demand from developing countries. However, they point out that
even though science is useful in order to plan an energy transition, it is also fundamental
to take in account both economic and political factors, which will govern the transition.
Technology is a key component of energy transitions, however as Smil (2016) mentions,
progress in electronics and technology created a perverse effect: the world expects new
discoveries to fix the issue of climate change, phenomenon he refers to as the Moore’s
curse. Throughout his article, Smil (2016) reflects on a set of points that need to be kept
in mind when dealing with energy transitions. First of all, he points out that the pace of
energy transitions will be very different depending on the type country that you are
studying. However he does insist that overall, all global energy transition are gradual
processes based on the alternative resources available, and even programs such as the
Energiewende in Germany prove that such actions are not only costly, but can sometimes
hide negative outcomes, such as the use of environmentally degrading materials, like
lignite, which not only produces more CO2 than hard coal, but also can affect
groundwater reserves in mines dump discharges (Lenk and Wisotzky, 2009).
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Since we are such a heavy fossil fuel civilization Smil (2016) insists that the goal
of the energy transition should not be switching from an energy to another but instead
reducing the greenhouse gas emissions. Not only, he points out the global growth of new
renewables has been quite slow, especially with the problem of intermittence that makes
countries still rely on fossil fuels as a backup energy, but he also makes the point that the
energy transitions that we focus on relate to electricity generation rather than total energy
consumption. Removing fossil fuels will be more difficult than what we expect it to be
since the transportation sector is so dependent on these resources, on top of other sectors
that use these fuels to create other products, such as plastic. Dorian, Franssen and
Simbeck (2006) also highlight the role of oil in energy transitions, specifically its known
limit: the finite aspect of its abundance. The demand of oil is expected to rise by more
than 50% by 2030, but the amount of oil available will not face such an increase, creating
a future lack of supply.
As Smil (2016) points out, we are still a fossil fueled civilization, and renewable
energies only grow at a 3% rate annually. The approach to a transition in energy
consumption is a gradual process, and even programs such as the Energiewende in
Germany prove that such actions are not only costly, but can sometimes hide negative
outcomes, such as the use of environmentally degrading materials, like lignite, which not
only produces more CO2 than hard coal, but also can affect groundwater reserves in
mines dump discharges (Lenk, Wisotzky, 2009). Additionally, not all consumption
sectors will react equally to the introduction of renewables. For instance, in the case of
the transport sector in America, although ethanol production diverts a large portion of
corn reserves, it cannot fully meet the fuel demand (Smil, 2016). Similarly, Welsh (2017)
points out that the transport sector represents a quarter of EU’s greenhouse gas emissions,
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and that the European Commission’s Transport White paper sets a goal to reduce these
emissions by 60% below the 1990 levels by 2050. We have to keep in mind that fossil
fuels have been used for generations, and therefore investments have been made in order
to put in place very costly infrastructure. Under an energy transition, these infrastructures
would have to be listed as stranded assets.

2.6 Previous Studies on Energy Transitions
Proposing an energy transition requires careful evaluation of its economic cost.
Price and Keppo (2017) explore the diversity of near cost optimal energy pathways
possibilities and their uncertainties using the TIAM UCL model, which separates the
world into 16 regions. They focus on an international level, and on a multitude of sectors
to come up with significantly different scenarios concerning the energy portfolios. They
use an approach called: Modeling to Generate Alternatives (MGA) which was also used
by DeCarolis in his study that we will mention later. Their approach “forces an
optimization model to search the feasible, near- optimal region of the solution space for
alternative solutions that are maximally different in decision space” (DeCarolis, 2010).
Price and Keppo (2017) implement MGA to make sure that supply meets demand, while
guaranteeing the lowest cost in order to show future plausible scenarios. Their results
show that variability occurs for certain energy sources such as coal and gas while oil is
not as affected as much, which could mean that its replacement will be more difficult
than the replacement of other energies. Additionally, the authors find that coal and gas
have the tendency to substitute for each other, even though coal is mostly used for power
generation and natural gas is used in different parts of the energy system. Interestingly,
with an increase in energy demand, the model ends up choosing less efficient
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technologies and resulted in an increase in the cost. Lastly, as mentioned earlier, not all
sectors react to energy portfolios changes in the same way: in this case it is shown that
the transport sector relied heavily on oil, therefore there would be a slower transition with
this energy source.
DeCarolis (2010) performs another modeling to generate alternatives study, using
CO2 emissions constraints until 2050. He executes two scenarios, one without any
constraints, and the second with CO2 emissions limitations of 15% of 2005. The author
uses a simple least-cost linear optimization model in order to observe the replacement of
existing fossil fuel infrastructures by renewables to meet the energy demand, and then
also applies MGA model to the same scenarios in order to compare the results. The base
model shows a combination of cycle gas turbines and pulverized coal, while the MGA
model suggests replacing the conventional coal with IGCC and geothermal. In general,
while running the MGA, one can observe that maximum cost flexibility to find
alternative solutions is present, which means that the cost of electricity is higher when
running MGA than the base model. However, unlike the base model, using MGA
provides a “set of feasible, near-optimal alternatives without the need to further constrain
the model” (DeCarolis, 2010).
The types of resources used during the energy transitions will impact the amount
of emissions released. Nuclear power, which is a popular energy source in France, could
be a major leader on the energy transition scene. Liquefied natural gas emits 490
tCO2/GWh while nuclear power only produces 12 tCO2/GWh, making it an interesting
alternative to reduce emissions (Lee et al., 2017). Indeed, countries could use nuclear
power in order to compensate for their demand from fossil fuels. Lee et al. examined the
existence of a link between nuclear power proportion and CO2 emissions. They found
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that by expanding the nuclear power proportion by 1%, a 0.26-0.32% decline in CO2
emissions per capita would follow. The environmental potential of this energy source is
favorable for an energy transition; however, the possible risks of a nuclear catastrophe
need to be kept in mind. Multiple countries already started phasing out this type of energy
source because of the fear of an accident. The authors highlight the idea that even though
some countries are starting to close down their power plants, using nuclear power more
intensively would help reaching GHG targets.
Similarly, Raimundo et al. (2018) performed a study in Brazil in order to observe
the possible reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in Brazil thanks to wind generation.
Wind power is a renewable energy that is becoming more and more popular, especially in
countries within the European Union. Depending on the location of the wind farm, the
life cycle emissions vary between 7.1 to 34.1 g CO2eq/kWh, which is significantly lower
than other sources such as coal, gas or even solar PV. Therefore, wind power is a strong
competitor to help Brazil reach its Paris Agreement target of GHG reduction by 43%
(Raimundo et al., 2018). The study estimated the avoided CO2 emissions between 2001
and 2016 to be 0.485 tCO2 per MWh generated. They analyzed three scenarios for 2030.
It was found that the amount of avoided greenhouse gas emissions could reach 5.77% of
the total Brazilian Energy Matrix emissions in 2030, which the authors considered to be
very significant since it only represented one energy source. Once again, using wind
coupled with other renewable energies would be beneficial to transition to a more
sustainable society, however because of the issue of intermittence, nuclear power could
be a tool for backup.
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CHAPTER 3
3.1 National Trends
France and Germany are two very different nations with regard to their energy
mix. France has been heavily reliant on nuclear heat to fulfill its electricity needs, and
barely produces any fossil fuels, which are needed by different consumption sectors. The
fossil fuel shortage has to be met by imports. France has also been investing into
renewables lately but has still some catching up to do in order to meet its neighbor’s
level: Germany, as can be observed from Figure 1. Germany has an advantage over
France in that its energy portfolio is much more diversified, and the country produces
fossil fuels and can therefore cover at least a portion of its demand, as Figure 1 shows.
Germany has been investing in fossil fuels, especially after launching its energy transition
project in 2012. However, as shown in Figure 1, France has a very high production of
nuclear heat, which is useful for an energy transition as it produces low levels of GHG
emissions. The Eurostat data sets were analyzed in order to understand energy resources
not only used by both countries, but also their domestic production levels and breakdown
by consumption sectors.
The energy sources considered for this research are: solid fuels, oil, gas,
hydropower, wind power, solar thermal and PV, solid biomass, biogas, biogasoline and
biodiesel, and finally nuclear heat. These energies represent the largest part in the energy
portfolio of both countries. Following are graphics that display patterns of consumption
energy mixes in 2015, as well as share of sectors for total demand for both countries. As
observed on the following Figures 2 and 3, France and Germany energy portfolios are
very different. Indeed, France uses a majority of nuclear heat, for electricity generation
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purposes, and also uses large amounts of oil and gas. In terms of renewables, the country
does use solid biomass, but its share in renewables compared to other energies is very
minimal. For Germany, the country uses a very large amount of fossil fuels, as can be
observed on Figure 3. The next largest energy share is from nuclear, followed by
renewables, which are in small portions compared to fossil fuels, but still higher than for
France. For energy consumption sectors, as can be observed on Figures 4 and 5, both
countries have similar trends, with the non-energy sector being the smallest, and the
service sector representing a similar share. However, for France, the largest sector of
consumption is the residential sector, while for Germany it is the industrial sector.

Figure 1: Original Domestic Production for France and Germany in 2015
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Figure 2: Original Energy Consumption for France in 2015

Figure 3: Original Energy Consumption for Germany in 2015
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Figure 4: Original Sectorial Demand for Energy in France in 2015

Figure 5: Original Sectorial Demand for Energy in Germany in 2015
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3.2 The Least Cost National Energy Model
A linear programming model was set up in order to find the most cost optimal
solutions for both countries to fulfill greenhouse gas targets while meeting energy
demand. Each country’s scenario was run separately and has its own energy portfolio
represented by energy sources (e.g.: solid fuels, oil, gas, hydro power, wind power, solar
thermal and PV, solid biomass, biogas, biogasoline and biodiesel, and finally nuclear
power), as well as end-use energy demand sectors (industrial, transportation, residential,
services and non-energy).
On the supply side of this model, energy resources can either come from domestic
production or from imports. To prevent the least-cost model from substituting import
sources for domestic sources, we kept the costs of import energy sources higher than the
domestic sources. For lack of better information, the costs of all imports were kept 10%
higher than those of domestic energy sources. Additionally, renewable energies were
allowed to expand with some reasonable capacity restrictions, while fossil fuels and
nuclear energy productions are set at current capacities. We also put minimum domestic
supplies on all sources to ensure that the model do not replace any energy sector
drastically within a short time, allowing for a smooth inter-source transition. On the
demand side, growth projections for sectorial demands for both France and Germany are
applied, and overall demand is expected to decrease throughout the study years. The
model runs from its base year of 2015 to 2030 in 5-year intervals.
The goal of the model is to ensure that the GHG targets for both countries are met
while guaranteeing that the supply of energy meets the sectorial demands, while keeping
cost at the lowest level possible and respecting inputted constraints (such as growth

22

constraints, minimum demand constraints or sectorial constraints). This linear program is
solved using the Simplex method on Microsoft Excel.

A. Variables
Table 1 delineates the model’s variables.
Table 1: List of Variables Used in the Model and Constraints
Notation
i

Definition
Energy source i = 1 (solid fuels), 2 (oil), 3 (gas), 4, (hydro power), 5 (wind
power), 6 (solar thermal and PV), 7 (solid biomass), 8 (biogas, bio gasoline
and biodiesel), 9 (nuclear)

j

Energy consumption sector j = 1 (industry ), 2 (transportation), 3
(residential), 4 (services), 5 (non energy)

F, G
t
&
'
𝐷𝑆#$%
,D𝑆#$%

Model countries, France and Germany, respectively
t = 2015, 2020, 2025, and 2030
Amount of domestic energy supplied by source i to consumption sector j in
year t for France and Germany, respectively

&
'
𝐼#$%
, 𝐼#$%

Amount of energy source i imported for consumption sector j in France
and Germany, respectively

𝑐#%& , 𝑐#%'

Cost of producing energy for each sector i in each country F and G,
respectively, for year t

&
'
𝑝#%
, 𝑝#%

Price of energy source i imported by country F and G, respectively, in year
t

̅ & , 𝑆#%
̅'
𝑆#%

Maximum amount of energy supplied by sector i in country F and G,
respectively, in year t
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-------#%'
𝐷𝑆#%& , 𝐷𝑆

Maximum amount of domestic energy supplied by sector i in country F
and G, respectively, in year t

& .'
.#$%
𝐷
, 𝐷#$%

Minimum amount of energy demanded by sector j in country F and G,
respectively, in year t

& ----'
---𝐷𝐷#$%
, 𝐷𝐷#$%

Minimum amount of domestic energy demanded by sector i in country F
and G, respectively, in year t

&
'
𝑔#%
, 𝑔#%

Greenhouse gas emission in CO2e/MWh for each sector i in each country
F and G, respectively, in year t

𝐺%̅ & , 𝐺%̅ '

Maximum amount of greenhouse gas emissions allowed for each sector i
in each country F and G, respectively, in year t

B. Cost Function
It is assumed that the national energy planning agency of each country attempts to
minimize the following objective function of national energy costs:
Total Energy Cost of France in year t
4
&
&
& &
= ∑7
#56 ∑$56{𝑐#% 𝐷𝑆#$% + 𝑝#% 𝐼#$% }

for all t

Total Energy Cost of Germany in year t
4
'
'
' '
= ∑7
#56 ∑$56{𝑐#% 𝐷𝑆#$% + 𝑝#% 𝐼#$% }

for all t

Each objective function is the sum of total the national costs of producing energy
from all model domestic sources and foreign source in a given period of time. Previous
studies have set up multi-year, least-cost optimization model in terms of present values of
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future costs. In our study, for simplicity, we simulate comparative static models for
several years independently, by treating model parameters exogenous (for instance, costs,
demands, capacity constraints, etc.). Our premise is that the future energy demand and
supply are more driven mostly by exogenous factors such as population, national income,
technology, and environmental regulations. Therefore, a series of static models with
appropriate adjustments for exogenous changes in model parameters would suffice for
evaluating our study objectives.

C. Constraints
1) GHG emission target
4
&
&
𝐹
̅&
∑7
#56 ∑$56{ 𝐷𝑆#$% + 𝐼#$% }𝑔𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝐺%

4
'
'
𝐺
̅'
∑7
#56 ∑$56{ 𝐷𝑆#$% + 𝐼#$% }𝑔𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝐺%

for all t and France

for all t and Germany

Each country has a specific GHG emission target that it needs to respect in order to
promote the Paris Accord. This constraint ensures that this target is met by forcing the
model to keep the total GHG emissions lower than the target. For each year, the
constraint will change based on the GHG emission target for each country, which strives
to decrease.

2) Maximum supply constraint
4
&
&
̅&
∑7
#56 ∑$56{ 𝐷𝑆#$% + 𝐼#$% } ≤ 𝑆#%

for all i, t and France

4
'
'
𝐺
̅'
∑7
#56 ∑$56{ 𝐷𝑆#$% + 𝐼#$% }𝑔𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑆#%

for all i, t and Germany
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The maximum constraint guarantees that the total amount of energy i supplied to all
consumption sectors combined through domestic production and imports be lower than
the total supply capacity for year t in both countries. The constraint also ensures that the
model does not call for unlimited shift to imports of certain high-carbon and low-cost
energy sources instead of shift to renewable sources. The supply of fossil fuels and
nuclear power is kept constant, while the supply of renewables (except hydropower) is set
to increase based on the targets of share of renewable energy for each country.
3) Maximum domestic supply constraint
7
&
---- &
∑4
Σ#56
$56 𝐷𝑆#$% ≤ 𝐷𝑆#%

for all i,j t and France

7
'
---- '
∑4
Σ#56
$56 𝐷𝑆#$% ≤ 𝐷𝑆#%

for all i,j t and Germany

Similarly, to the previous constraint, the maximum domestic supply constraint sets a
maximum domestic supply capacity that the model should not surpass.

4) Minimum Demand Constraint
&
&
.&
∑7
#56{𝐷𝑆#$% + 𝐼#$% } ≥ 𝐷$%

for all j, t and France

'
'
.'
∑7
#56{𝐷𝑆#$% + 𝐼#$% } ≥ 𝐷$%

for all j, t and Germany

The minimum demand constraint makes sure that the actual supply of energy to
consumption sectors through domestic production and imports is higher than the
minimum demand of these consumption sectors.
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5) Minimum Domestic Demand Constraint
&
&
----#$%
𝐷𝑆#$%
≥ 𝐷𝐷
for all i, j, t and France
'
'
𝐷𝑆#$%
≥ ---𝐷𝐷#$%

for all i, j, t and Germany

Similarly, to the previous constraint, the minimum domestic constraint ensures that
domestic supply of energy to the consumption sectors is higher than the minimum
demand in different types of energies i to sectors j. This constraint ensures that there is no
abrupt reduction in any energy supplied from each production sector to each consumption
sector in a short amount of time.

6) Transportation Sector Constraint
&
&
.&
∑7
#5@,A{𝐷𝑆#,$5@,% + 𝐼#,$5@,% } ≥ 𝐷 $5@,%

'
'←
.'
∑7
#5@,A{𝐷𝑆#,$5@,% + 𝐼#,$5@,% } ≥ 𝐷,$5@%

for all t and France
for all t and Germany

The transportation sector is unique in that it will have difficulties transitioning to greener
energies and that it is heavily reliant on oil, and some biofuel. To guarantee a minimum
transportation fuel demand met, the model forces the transportation sector to draw a
minimum amount of energy from these two resources.

7) Industry Sector Constraint
&
&←
.&
∑7
#5C{𝐷𝑆#5C,$56,% + 𝐼#5C,$56,% } ≤ 𝐷#5C,$56,%

'
'←
.'
∑7
#5C{𝐷𝑆#5C,$56,% + 𝐼#5C,$56,% } ≤ 𝐷#5C,$56,%
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for all j=2, t and France

for all j=2, t and Germany

Biomass is an energy that is usually used by households for heating and cooking
purposes. In order to prioritize residential use, the industry sector constraint forces the
model to supply a certain amount of biomass and not more to the industrial sector.

8) Service Sector Constraint
&
&←
.&
∑7
#5@ 𝐷𝑆#5C,$5D,% + 𝐼#5C,$5D,% ≤ 𝐷#5C,$5D,%

'
'←
.'
∑7
#5@ 𝐷𝑆#5C,$5D,% + 𝐼#5C,$5D,% ≤ 𝐷#5C,$5D,%

for all j=2, t and France

for all j=2, t and Germany

The service sector constraint is similar to the previous constraint. The domestic biomass
supplied to the service sector has no other substitute and hence the model ensures a
minimum demand to be met for the said sector.

9) Non-Negativity Constraint
𝐺←
&
'
𝐷𝑆#$%
, D𝑆#$%
, 𝑌𝐹←
𝑗𝑡 , 𝑌𝑗𝑡 , ≥ 0

The non-negativity constraint simply states that none of the values obtained in this model
are to be negative.

3.3 Data Gathering and Analysis
Energy balance sheets for the countries of France and Germany were obtained
through the Eurostat database (Eurostat, 2017). The database provides information for
different energy resources including the amounts of domestic production, imports,
exports, gross inland consumption inputs and outputs to create derived heat and
electricity, as well as available energy for final consumption. Furthermore, the
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information on the breakdown of their consumption between different sectors is also
available. These data were obtained from years 1990 to 2015 for France, Germany, as
well as the European Union. The energy sources chosen for this research were: solid
fuels, oil, gas, hydro power, wind power, solar thermal and PV, solid biomass, biogas,
biogasoline and biodiesel and nuclear heat. The portfolio of energies chosen gives a
diversified choice of resources and focuses on the most used ones for these two nations.
As mentioned before, these energy sources together represent 99 percent of total energy
consumed in France and 98 percent in Germany in 2015. Fossil fuels are still an
important portion of consumption and had to be represented. Similarly, nuclear heat
makes up a large share of the energy portfolio for both countries. In terms of renewables,
hydro power was accounted for, even though dams have usually a long process for
construction and new infrastructure is less likely to appear. In contrast, wind power and
solar power will take less time to put in place. Biomass is an energy that is used by many
households, and biofuels are an important alternative to oil, especially in the
transportation sector. In terms of demand sectors, industrial, residential, transportation,
services and non-energy sectors were chosen. These consumption sectors represent 97
percent and almost 100 percent of France and Germany’s consumptions, respectively.
The first step after the data was extracted was to convert the existing data in kilotonne of
oil equivalent to gigawatt per hour. The conversion rate used for this step was:

1 ktoe= 11.63 GWh
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A. Electricity and Derived Heat Break Down
Since the breakdown of electricity and indirect heat was not available in the
worksheet, the computation had to be done in order to make sure to account for all energy
types used at the end. Gross inland consumption was calculated by adding primary
production with imports and subtracting exports from the total. The research performed
in this paper does not account for possible exports for both countries. From the gross
inland consumption of each energy type, a certain portion goes towards input to create
derived heat, electricity and other products, while another portion goes directly to the
final consumption. To calculate the electricity and derived heat by source type, the first
step was to subtract transformation output from transformation input in order to get rid of
any byproducts that were created and only focus on derived heat and electricity. Some
fuels such as hydro power, wind power and a portion of solar were accounted in the
Exchange, Transfers and Returns row, and directly produced electricity. The Total
Transformation Input was calculated by adding each energy’s inputs, as well as the
Exchange, Transfers and Returns. After that, similarly, the total derived heat and
electricity from transformation output as well as the one from Exchange, Transfers and
Returns were summed to give a Total Transformation Output. This Total Transformation
Output gives the total electricity and derived heat produced but does not yet account for
losses.
The next step is to find the share of each type of energy within the total inputs.

HIJK% LM NINOPQ #

Share of Input of Energy i = RSRTU RVT4W&SV7TRHS4 H4XYR × 100
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It is important to remember that when producing electricity, losses occur,
therefore Total Transformation Output does not equal Total Available for Consumption.
Since we were given the Total Available for Consumption of electricity and derived heat,
and the Total Transformation Output is available as well, we can find the efficiency of
electricity and derived heat production for both countries

Efficiency =

RSRTU T\THUT]U^ &SV _S4WY7XRHS4
RSRTU RVT4W&SV7TRHS4 SYRXYR

× 100

For France, the efficiency was found to be 75.31% while for Germany it was
found to be 81.54%. These percentage can be applied to each input of fuel in order to
obtain the amount of energy used for electricity and derived heat for each source type. To
spread these numbers to the different sectors of demand, the share of electricity and
derived heat from the total available was calculated for each of the five sectors. The final
step to obtain the final available for consumption numbers for each fuel type was to sum
up the original total available with the numbers from electricity production by fuel type.

B. Accounting for Trade
In order to keep the model simple, exports were not taken into account in the
presented research since they were a small portion of the total energy production in most
cases. However, imports were explicitly considered since they can supply additional fuels
for each energy type and significantly contribute to GHG targets. For exports, the same
percentages of electricity and derived heat production were used, and the results were
subtracted from the total gross inland consumption. For imports, the same steps for
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finding shares of energy types towards electricity and derived heat production were used,
however Total European numbers were used, as we would expect electricity and derived
heat imports to come from different countries within the European Union. Additionally,
we noted that gas and oil sources had a unique situation and needed to be treated
different. Even though their domestic productions were fairly low, we noticed that a high
amount of gas and oil was still exported. Since pipelines go through the countries and
therefore distribution of gas and oil were reported as both an import and an export even if
the country in question did not use it. Therefore, the exports of both countries were
subtracted from their imports, meaning that we assumed that all domestic production
went towards the country’s own consumption and that their exports of oil and gas were
zero.
We have now a new Gross Inland Consumption which accounts for the imports
and the domestic production for each country by fuel type, as well as the electricity and
derived heat production by fuel type. The next step was to break down this Gross inland
consumption into the different consumption sectors. The same ratio from consumption by
sector compared to total available for consumption was used in order to do so

^INOPQ _LIbKcJ%#LI WNd%LO $
Final GIC for sector j = &#I`a
× 𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
RL%`a Te`#a`faN MLO _LIbKcJ%#LI

The share of domestic production for each energy type was also calculated using the
following formula:
Domestic production share =

XO#c`OQ JOLsKd%#LItNuJLO%b
'OLbb #Ia`Is dLIbKcJ%#LI
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× 100

From this calculation, the GWh from primary production for each fuel were
obtained for each demand sector.

C. Levelized Cost of Electricity
The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) coefficients were obtained thanks to
multiple reports, such as the International Energy Agency Electricity Information report,
which listed LCOE for multiple countries. Levelized cost refers to the unit cost of an
asset over the lifetime electricity generating capacity of that asset. When data for one or
the other country were unavailable, a conversion factor was used. In order to do so, a
comparison of electricity plants existing in both countries was used, and a ratio was
obtained by comparing average price difference for these plants. It was found that
average LCOE of French power plants was on average 106.5% more expensive than the
same power plants in Germany. Additionally, since most of the costs were not for 2015, a
GDP deflator was used to calculate the net present value. Here listed are the final
levelized cost of electricity that were used for France and Germany:

Table 2 lists the final LCOE of energy that were used for France and Germany.
The production costs indicated below correspond to the average production costs incurred
by an investor throughout the economic life of his installation. They depend in particular
on the following parameters:

•

investment costs (excluding connection): equipment, civil engineering,
contingencies, dismantling;
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•

operating and maintenance costs including fuel costs when purchased
(which is not the case, for example, with the wind or the sun);

•

the discount rate, which is the expected rate of return that could be
obtained by investing the same capital elsewhere;

•

the level of production: the following data will be given "reasonably
favorable" conditions;

•

the economic life of the plant.

Table 2: Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) in 2018 US$/ MWh

Resource

Anthracite
and
Lignite

Oil

Germany

79

France

83

Biogas,
Solid
Biogasoline
Biomass
and
Biodiesel

Gas

Hydro
Power

Wind
Power

Solar
Thermal
and PV

512

107

112

112

117

86

90

82

478

100

112

112

117

86

90

85

Nuclear

D. Greenhouse Gas Coefficients and Targets
The greenhouse gas emissions were available from the World Nuclear Association’s
report (WNA, 2011), with lowest, highest and mean values. These numbers were
expressed in tonnes CO2 equivalent per gigawatt hour. Table 3 shows all the greenhouse
gas emissions per source.
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Table 3: Greenhouse Gas Coefficients in Tonnes CO2 e / GWh

Anthracite
Resource

and

Oil

Gas

lignite

Hydro

Wind

power

power

Solar
thermal
and PV

Biogas,
Solid

biogasoline

Biomass

and bio

Nuclear

diesel

Germany

971

733

499

26

26

88

45

90
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France

971

733

499

26

26

88

45

90

29

In order to gather these data, the mean values for greenhouse gas emissions were
used. For anthracite and lignite, we used an average of both sources. For biogas, the
greenhouse gas coefficient was computed by dividing the total amount of greenhouse gas
in Germany coming from biogas (O’Connor, 2011) by the total GWh used.

Since each country has specific greenhouse gas target, and that these targets are
based on 1990 consumption levels, the same computations as above were performed on
the 1990 data for both countries to calculate the greenhouse gas emissions level in that
basis year. Following, the table 4 lists the greenhouse gas emission targets in tonnes CO2e
for both nations between 2015 to 2050, which were derived from their reduction goals.
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Table 4: Greenhouse Gas Targets for France and Germany in tonnes of CO2 e

Country

2015

2020

2025

2030

France

964,950,675

877,253,166

767,596,520

657,939,874

Germany

2,196,117,315

1,699,350,479

1,486,931,669

1,274,512,859

E. Forecasting for LCOE, Demand and Capacity
1) LCOE
Estimation for France future’s demand was based on the ADEME Energy
Transition Scenario Report (Vidalenc, Meunier and Topper, 2013), which gave
projections for the future demand of Transportation, Industry, Service, Residential. Nonenergy was not included in the report therefore we applied the same growth rate as the
industrial sector.

Levelized Cost Of Electricity future estimation was based on the CE Delft report
“Cost-effective share bioenergy 2030”, which listed the percent reduction of LCOE
between 2015 and 2030 (Warringa, Schep, Afman and Bruyn, 2016). For wind, offshore
and onshore values were averaged. Similarly, for solar, thermal and PV values were also
averaged. For biogas, bio gasoline and biodiesel, the value for biofuels was used. For
non-renewable energies, a 2% price increase per year was applied, using an average cost
inflation (Eurostat, 2018). For hydropower, since it is less likely for countries to build
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dams because of the cost and time needed, a 1% price increase was applied. Following
are the estimated future LCOEs.

Table 5: Future LCOE for France in $/ GWh

Anthracite
and

Oil

Gas

lignite

Hydro

Wind

power

power

Solar
thermal
and PV

Solid
Biomass

Biogas, bio
gasoline and
biodiesel

Nuclear

2015

83,000

478,049

100,000 112,000

112,000 117,000

86,000

143,840

85,000

2020

91,639

527,804

110,408 117,713

100,800 100,035

81,127

135,210

93,847

2025

101,177

582,739

121,899 123,718

89,600

83,070

76,253

126,579

103,615

2030

111,707

643,391

134,587 130,029

78,400

66,105

71,380

117,949

114,399

Table 6: Future LCOE for Germany in $/ GWh

Anthracite
and

Oil

Gas

lignite

Hydro

Wind

power

power

Solar
thermal
and PV

Biogas, bio
Solid

gasoline

Biomass

and

Nuclear

biodiesel

2015

79,000

511,512

107,000

112,000

112,000

117,000

86,000

143,840

82,000

2020

87,222

564,751

118,137

117,713

100,800

100,035

81,127

135,210

90,535

2025

96,301

623,532

130,432

123,718

89,600

83,070

76,253

126,579

99,958

2030

106,324

688,428

144,008

130,029

78,400

66,105

71,380

117,949

110,361
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2) Demand
We estimated future energy demands using two sources: the ADEME study
(Vidalenc, Meunier and Topper, 2013) for France and the Enerdata study (Hafner, 2017)
for Germany. These studies gave the evolution for demand of different sectors. For the
non-energy sector which there was no available information for, the same percent change
in future demand as for the industry was assumed for lack of better information.

Table 7: Future Sector Demand for France in GWh
2015

2020

2025

2030

Industry

630,672

616,482

602,611

589,053

Transport

816,466

777,684

740,744

705,559

Residential

601,895

561,267

523,382

488,054

Services

162,930

156,413

150,156

144,150

Non-Energy

584,191

571,047

558,199

545,639

Total Demand

2,796,155

2,670,328

2,550,164

2,435,406

Table 8: Future Sector Demand for Germany in GWh
2015

2020

2025

2030

Industry

1,047,678

1,020,409

993,850

967,982

Transport

803,294

753,848

707,446

663,900

Residential

854,457

797,792

744,886

695,487

Services

614,555

610,159

605,795

601,461

Non-Energy

265,707

258,791

252,056

245,495

Total Demand

3,585,692

3,461,937

3,342,454

3,227,095
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3) Capacity
It was important to also account for future changes in capacity, especially for
renewables. In order to do so, we used the renewable share target for France (23% by
2020, 32 % by 2030) and Germany (60% by 2050) (European Commission) and
increased the domestic production capacity accordingly. The fossil fuels and nuclear heat
capacities were kept constant for the model as the productions from these sources were
expected to be reduced and keeping them constant would not affect the model results. For
hydro power, the supply was also kept constant since the chances of new dams being
built in the model’s time frame is small.

Table 9: Future Domestic Production Capacity for France in GWh
2015

2020

2025

2030

Solid fuels

103,417

103,417

103,417

103,417

Oil

852,053

852,053

852,053

852,053

Gas

387,443

387,443

387,443

387,443

Hydro Power

51,049

51,049

51,049

51,049

Wind power

20,144

53,785

61,414

68,248

Solar Thermal and
PV

8,016

21,402

24,438

27,157

Solid Biomass

110,111

294,005

335,709

373,064

Biogas,
Biogasoline and
Biodiesel

40,703

108,680

124,096

137,905

Nuclear heat

1,223,220

1,223,220

1,223,220

1,223,220
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Table 10: Future Domestic Production Capacity for Germany in GWh
2015

2020

2025

2030

Solid fuels

882,860

882,860

882,860

882,860

Oil

1,254,666

1,254,666

1,254,666

1,254,666

Gas

777,372

777,372

777,372

777,372

Hydro Power

19,537

19,537

19,537

19,537

Wind power

76,023

118,730

157,956

193,981

Solar Thermal and
PV

44,753

69,893

92,984

114,192

Solid Biomass

139,621

218,053

290,094

356,257

Biogas,
Biogasoline and
Biodiesel

119,070

185,957

247,394

303,819

Nuclear heat

271,790

271,790

271,790

271,790

3.4 Scenarios
Three main scenarios were performed thanks to this model in order to generate
alternative results. The first scenario performed was a policy stimulation one, with the
goal of promoting a decrease in GHG emissions in order to meet the Paris Accord targets,
as well as a decrease in sectorial demand. The second scenario was a business as usual
(BAU) scenario, where demand and GHG total emissions were kept at the 2015 level.
The last scenario performed was the cost of carbon scenario, where we aimed to find the
cost to remove a tonne of carbon with different GHG levels.
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A. Policy Stimulation Scenario
The current research starts with the policy stimulation scenario, model that runs in
the years 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030. For these years, demands were estimated thanks to
two studies: for Germany, the Enerdata study written by Hafner (2017) was used, while
for France the ADEME study of 2013 was applied. Both of these studies provided 2030
sectorial demands by share of total consumption. For the non-energy sector, which was
not listed in these research papers, the same rate as the industrial sector was applied. This
scenario is the main one for this research as it promotes the idea that an energy transition
is doable, and that conservation and efficiency will not only reduce GHG emissions but
will also cut costs.

B. Business as Usual (BAU) Scenario
The second set of scenarios that were performed did not include any changes in demand
nor any GHG emission constraints over time, in order to compare how the total energy
cost and GHG emissions would evolve. We kept the demand and the GHG emissions at
the 2015 level, while increasing the capacity in the same way as we did in the policy
stimulation scenario. The scenario presented is fundamental as it shows how costs and
GHG emissions will evolve if no action plan is put in place in order to mitigate climate
change.

C. Cost of Carbon Scenario
For the baseline year of 2015, the model was run by applying different slacks to
the greenhouse gas emissions constraints until the model could not find a solution. For
France, the model was run at 100%, 95%, 90%, and finally 86%. For Germany, the
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model was run at 100%, 97.5%, 95% and 94.5%. These last scenarios are crucial to
evaluate the impact and efficiency of the current GHG emissions for the 2015 level: if the
marginal cost of removing an additional tonne of carbon is low, it means the country can
still reduce its target without facing major costs and without making major technological
changes. If the cost is high, it means that the country is already closest to the least-cost
optimal energy mix for the given emission target.
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CHAPTER 4
4.1 Results
A. Policy Stimulation Scenario
1) Results for France for the Policy Stimulation Scenario
Below are the tables that show the results for the country of France when running the
policy stimulation scenario.

a) Demand by Sector
Table 11 shows the sectorial demand for energy for France for different years.

Table 11: France Demand by Sector in GWh

2015

2020

2025

2030

Industry

584,191

571,047

558,199

545,639

Transport

630,672

616,482

602,611

589,053

Residential

816,466

777,684

740,744

705,559

Services

601,895

561,267

523,382

488,054

Non-Energy

162,930

156,413

150,156

144,150

Total Demand

2,796,155

2,682,894

2,575,092

2,472,454
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Figure 6: France Demand by Sector in GWh

Table 11 and figure 6 present optimal combination of energy demand for France. As
we can observe, some sectors are set to decrease in demand faster than others, such as the
residential sector, but overall, we have a decreasing trend. The optimal total energy
consumption will decrease from 2,796,155 GWh in 2015 to 2,472,454 GWh in 2030
(Table 11), which is an almost 12% reduction. It is important to note that by design
sectors such as transportation or non-energy will have more difficulties transitioning to
renewables and are still dependent heavily on fossil fuels. Overall, the decreasing trend
can be explained by conservation efforts, but also by improvements in technologies that
will increase efficiency.
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b) Domestic Production by Energy Type
Table 12 shows France’s domestic production until 2030 for different energy types.
Table 12: France Domestic Production by Energy Type in GWh

2015

2020

2025

2030

Oil

12,576

12,576

12,576

12,576

Gas

222

185

177

170

Hydro Power

56,154

43,367

41,305

39,355

Wind power

22,158

59,163

67,556

75,073

Solar Thermal and

8,817

23,542

26,882

29,873

Solid Biomass

121,123

323,405

366,670

349,727

Biogas,

39,115

104,439

119,254

132,523

Nuclear Heat

1,312,284

1,312,284

1,312,284

1,211,341

Total Domestic

1,572,448

1,878,961

1,946,703

1,850,638

Solid fuels

PV

Biogasoline,
Biodiesel

Production
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Figure 7: France Domestic Production in GWh

As we can observe from table 12 and figure 7, the total domestic energy supply
will increase from 1,572,448 GWh in 2015 to 1,850,6378 in 2018. In total, the domestic
supply will observe an increase of 18% percent during the model period. Wind power,
solar power and biofuels are the sectors that are expected to increase the most (over
300%). Hydro power on the other hand is the sector that is expected to decrease the most
(a reduction in almost 30%) due to its increase in price, and the fact that it is not as
needed as fossil fuels. France energy portfolio in terms of production was, and will
continue to be, restricted to certain energy types, especially nuclear power. The country
barely produces any fossil fuels, meaning that they will need to import these resources in
order to meet the demand. The country produces some renewables at an increasing
proportion, and even though they are not comparable to nuclear power. It is important
that even though the country produces high amounts of nuclear energy, this type of
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energy goes towards electricity production, and therefore, cannot supply demand of the
non-energy sector.

c) Total Energy Consumption by Energy Type for France
Following is table 13 listing total energy consumed by energy types for France in
thousands GWh until 2030.

Table 13: France Total Energy Consumption
2015

2020

2025

2030

Solid fuels

318

187

43

10

Oil

709

615

578

545

Gas

170

0

0

0

Hydro Power

56

43

41

39

Wind power

22

59

68

75

Solar Thermal and

9

24

27

30

Solid Biomass

121

323

369

410

Biogas,

45

120

137

152

1,346

1,312

1,312

1,211

PV

Biogasoline,
Biodiesel
Nuclear Heat
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Total Domestic

2,796

2,683

2,575

2,472

Production

Figure 8: France Total Energy Consumption

As it can be noticed, France’s energy consumption varies to some extent by 2030.
Indeed, it can be observed that fossil fuels decrease significantly, especially solid fuels
and gas. This can be explained not only by the fact that these resources are very high in
CO2 emissions, but also because France does produces very low amount of fossil fuels,
meaning that they need to import the needed resources, which add up to be costly. Oil
does decrease in amount; however, it is still very high which can be explained by the
reliance on this resource of the transport sector. It is notable that the biofuel sector
increases, giving the opportunity to substitute some of the oil demand. Nuclear still
represents a high portion of the consumption, mainly due to its low GHG coefficient.
However, you can see a decrease throughout the years which can be explained by a lower
demand but also a higher price. In terms of renewables, there is a slight increase for all
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sectors except the hydropower one (due to its increase in price). This increase is slow
because of all the minimum demand constraints inputted, in order to guarantee a smooth
and stable transition.

d) Energy Consumption Mix for France
Following are graphical representations of the energy mixes for France for the future
years that the model was run.

Figure 9: Energy Consumption Mix for France in 2015
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Figure 10: Energy Consumption Mix for France in 2020

Figure 11: Energy Consumption Mix for France in 2025
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Figure 12: Energy Consumption Mix for France in 2030

As it can be observed, in 2015 fossil fuels and nuclear represent over 80% of
France’s energy consumption, while for 2030, they represent less than 75%. Even though
this is not an immense change, we are focused on a smooth and durable transition. From
the Figures 9 to 12, both solid fuels and gas are taken out of the energy mix, which is
great since they produce high GHG emissions. However, oil still represents about a
quarter of the energy mix, even by 2030. This is due to the fact that the transport sector is
so reliant on this type of energy. In terms of renewables, their overall consumption and
production increases, except for hydropower (because of its cost increase). Wind power
increases by 2%, solar continues to represent about 1% of the consumption mix, biogas
increase from 2 to 6%, while solid biomass manages to increase from 4 to 17%, mainly
because of its low emissions, rather low cost and high use in residential.
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e) Total Cost and Total GHG emissions
Following is Table 14 showing total cost and total GHG emissions for France until 2030.
Table 14: France Total Cost and GHG Emissions in Millions Dollars and tonnes CO2e

Total Cost in

2015

2020

2025

2030

561,451

554,175

569,851

585,249

965

700

538

482

Millions
Total GHG in
Millions

Figure 13:France Total Cost and GHG Emissions in Millions Dollars and tonnes CO2e
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Table 14 and figure 13- show the total cost of energy consumed and the total GHG
emitted. As expected, GHG emissions go down since we imposed constraints to meet the
GHG targets throughout the years and as required by the Paris Climate Accord. In terms
of costs, we do see a decrease at first in 2020, which can be explained by the fact that
demand has decreased while costs have increased slightly for fossil fuels and nuclear.
However, after that costs will increase due to the fact that prices of the fossil fuels and
nuclear energy increase, and France still has to meet a minimum demand of these
energies for some sectors such as transport. Since France does not produce any fossil
fuels, it has to import them which costs additional money for the nation.

f) Total Demand and Total Cost
Following is Table 15 showing total demand and total cost for France until 2030.
Table 15: France Total Demand and Total Cost in Millions GWh and Dollars
2015

2020

2025

2030

Total Cost in
Millions

561,451

554,175

569,851

585,249

Total Demand in
Millions

2.80

2.68

2.58

2.47
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Figure 14: France Total Demand and Total Cost in Millions GWh and Dollars

As mentioned earlier, demand is set to decrease throughout the years, which can
be explained by not only conservation actions put in place, but also by increased
efficiency that allows technologies to use less energy for the same output level. As
demand starts decreasing for 2020, the total costs decrease as well simply because of a
smaller need of energy resources. However, with increased costs of fossil fuels and
nuclear source, which still make up a larger portion of France’s consumption portfolio,
the overall costs will increase for the future years. We would expect a transition that
switches automatically to renewables, however such a plan is not realistic. Indeed, an
adaptation time, where fossil fuels are still present while renewables increase is needed.

a. Results for Germany for the Policy Stimulation Scenario
a) Demand by Sector
Table 16 lists the demand by sectors for Germany until 2030.
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Table 16: Germany Demand by Sector in GWh

2015

2020

2025

2030

Industry

1,047,678

1,020,409

993,850

967,982

Transport

803,294

753,848

707,446

663,900

Residential

854,457

797,792

744,886

695,487

Services

614,555

610,159

605,795

601,461

Non-Energy

265,707

258,791

252,056

245,495

Total Demand

3,585,692

3,441,001

3,304,032

3,174,327

Figure 15: Germany Total Demand by Sector in GWh

Similarly to France, Germany will have an overall decreasing trend when it comes
to sectoral demand, but the decreases are in different sectors compared to France’s case.
Unlike France, Germany sees a large decrease in its transport sector, meaning that they
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will have to find alternatives for petroleum to power vehicles. Unlike France, the services
sector does not decrease a lot, and so doesn’t the non-energy sector.

b) Domestic Production by Energy Type
Table 17 depicts Germany’s domestic energy production under the policy stimulation
scenario.
Table 17: Germany Domestic Production by Energy Type in GWh

2015

2020

2025

2030

Solid fuels

500,135

500,135

311,893

377,912

Oil

42,055

42,055

42,055

42,055

Gas

73,677

73,677

73,677

73,677

Hydro Power

20,875

18,977

18,976

18,977

Wind power

83,626

123,700

164,569

202,103

Solar Thermal and

49,228

72,671

96,681

118,731

Solid Biomass

153,583

219,076

291,455

357,929

Biogas,

130,977

200,807

267,150

328,080

275,358

275,358

275,358

275,358

PV

Biogasoline and
Biodiesel
Nuclear heat
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TOTAL

1,329,514

1,526,458

1,541,815

1,794,822

Figure 16: Germany Domestic Production in GWh

As we can observe from this graphic, Germany has a much more diversified
portfolio than France does since it does produce quite some fossil fuels. On top of that,
Germany is known to be a pioneer country when it comes to renewables and has been
heavily investing in them (Beveridge and Kern, 2013), especially after the Energiewende
program they put in place a few years ago. Even though there are many political
initiatives to close nuclear plants by 2022 in Germany (Drmota, 2017), we decided to
keep the supply constant (for both countries) in order to guarantee a smooth transition,
since nuclear power is known to have very low GHG emissions. The domestic production
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portfolio of Germany is more optimal than France’s because it produces a minimum level
of each type of energy, meaning that they do not have to import as much as France does.

c) Total Energy Consumption by Energy Type for Germany
Table 18: Germany Total Energy Consumption
2015

2020

2025

2030

Solid fuels

1,085

877

312

378

Oil

993

738

951

557

Gas

787

855

855

855

Hydro Power

21

21

21

21

Wind power

84

131

174

213

Solar Thermal and

49

77

102

126

Solid Biomass

154

240

319

392

Biogas,

131

205

272

334

Nuclear Heat

299

601

879

848

Total Domestic

3,603

3,744

3,877

3,725

PV

Biogasoline,
Biodiesel

Consumption
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Figure 17: Germany Total Energy Consumption

As it can be noticed on this graph, there is an overall decline for Germany when it
comes to fossil fuels. Indeed, solid fuels are reduced dramatically, and so is oil
consumption. For some reason, the model supplies large amounts of gas in order to meet
demand. It is also important to point out that nuclear power increases throughout the
years, which can be explained by its low GHG coefficient. In terms of renewables, all of
them increase except hydro power, Solid biomass and biogas increase the most, which is
good since biomass has a low GHG emissions, and biofuels can be used to replace oil.

d) Energy Consumption Mix for Germany
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Figure 18: Energy Consumption Mix for Germany in 2015

Figure 19: Energy Consumption Mix for Germany in 2020
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Figure 20: Energy Consumption Mix for Germany in 2025

Figure 21: Energy Consumption Mix for Germany in 2030
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As it can be observed throughout these graphs, the share of fossil fuels decreases
highly throughout the model years. The only fossil fuel that does not decrease as
mentioned earlier, is gas. Nuclear increases in proportion, and ends up representing 23%
of the consumption mix by 2030. Additionally, all renewables increases and start
representing a more important share of the energy mix.

e) Total Cost and Total GHG emissions

The following Table 19 lists the total costs as well as the total emissions resulting from
the policy stimulation scenario.

Table 19: Germany Total Cost and GHG Emissions in Million Dollars and tonnes CO2e

Total Cost in

2015

2020

2025

2030

803,864

743,359

916,305

721,505

2,196

1,867

1,487

1,275

Millions
Total GHG in
Millions
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Figure 22: Germany Total Cost and GHG Emissions in Million Dollars and tonnes CO2e

As we can observe from this Figure 22, GHG emissions were set to decrease in
the model time period based on the GHG targets. However, the 40% decrease from the
1990 level target for 2020 was not feasible for this model, therefore an 85% of the 2015
level value was used. Similarly to France, the cost first decreases because of the decrease
in demand and the smaller target that we put in place in terms of GHG emissions.
However, for 2025, the cost increases by a lot because the model has to deal with a
bigger jump in GHG emissions drop and has to buy renewable energy while still meeting
a minimum fossil fuel domestic production and importation, which can be costly. By
2030, the country has prioritized renewables for its smaller demand, which results in
smaller costs.

f) Total Demand and Total Cost
Table 20 shows the total demand and the total cost for Germany until 2030.
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Table 20: Germany Total Demand and Total Cost in Millions GWh and Dollars
2015

2020

2025

2030

Total Cost

816,505

743,359

916,305

721,505

Total Demand

3.59

3.44

3.30

3.17

Figure 23: Germany Total Demand and Total Cost in Millions GWh and Dollars

As discussed previously, demand was set to be lowered throughout the years, and
explains the first decrease in price in 2020, where the country was facing a slight increase
in price for certain energies but had a lower demand. However, with stricter GHG
emission targets and higher costs of fossil fuels, nuclear and hydro, the country had to
deal with an increase in price in 2025 in order to meet a more drastic GHG target. By
2030, since the target was not as drastic anymore and the demand was a lot smaller, the
total cost decreased and ended up being lower than the initial 2015 value.

64

B. Business as Usual (BAU) scenario
The second set of scenarios that were performed did not include any demand nor
any GHG emission constraints in order to compare how cost and GHG emissions would
evolve. We have kept the demand and the GHG emissions at the 2015 level, while
increasing the capacity in the same way as we did in the policy stimulation scenario.
Following are the results obtained when performing this scenario:

1) Results for France for BAU Scenario
a) Domestic Production by Energy Type
Table 21 depicts France’s domestic production under the BAU scenario.
Table 21: France Domestic Production by Energy Types in GWh

2015

2020

2025

2030

Solid fuels

-

-

-

-

Oil

12,576

12,576

12,576

12,576

Gas

223

193

193

193

Hydro Power

56,154

45,546

45,546

45,546

Wind power

22,158

59,163

67,556

75,073

Solar Thermal and

8,817

23,542

26,882

29,873

PV
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Solid Biomass

121,123

323,405

369,280

403,121

Biogas,

39,115

104,439

119,254

132,523

1,312,284

1,312,284

1,312,284

1,312,284

Biogasoline and
Biodiesel
Nuclear heat

Figure 24: France Domestic Production in GWh

For Table 21 and Figure 24, it is quickly understandable than even in the BAU scenario,
renewables will take over and start increasing in proportion. Indeed, the total production
stays the same, so does oil and nuclear heat production. For gas, domestic production
goes down by 13 percent, and by almost 19% for hydropower. Other renewables, on their
side, increase to be over 300% of the 2015 value in that time period due to the fact that
their costs are expected to decrease throughout time.
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b) Comparison of Cost in Million Dollars under Scenario 1 and 2
The table number 22 compares the results in terms of cost between the two scenarios
performed
Table 22: Costs under Scenario 1 and 2 in Million Dollars
2015

2020

2025

2030

Scenario 1 (Policy
Stimulation)

561,451

554,175

569,851

585,249

Scenario 2 (BAU)

561,451

575,104

615,114

657,512

Figure 25: Costs under Scenario 1 and 2 in Million Dollars

Both scenarios have the same shape in terms of trend, but the overall cost with a
policy stimulation, or the application of the Paris Accord scenario) is a lot less than with
the baseline scenario. This is due to the fact that energy demand will decrease over time
67

as a result of complying with the GHG reduction target under the Paris Accord. Therefore
it is important to note that setting up GHG targets will not only mitigate climate change,
but will also decrease spending on energy

c) Comparison of GHG emissions in Million Tonnes of CO2e under Scenario 1 and
2
The table 23 below compares the results in terms of GHG emissions between the two
scenarios performed
Table 23: GHG emissions under Scenario 1 and 2 in Million Tonnes CO2e
2015

2020

2025

2030

Scenario 1 (Policy
Stimulation)

964.95

700.08

537.66

481.81

Scenario 2
(Business as usual)

964.95

803.29

739.03

681.47
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Figure 26: GHG Emissions under Scenario 1 and 2 in Million Tonnes CO2e

It can be determined that for both scenarios, the total emissions do go down. Both
of the results have similar trends, and as expected the Paris Accord targets implementing
scenario was more successful at reducing GHG emissions by 2030 (482 million of tonnes
of CO2e) than the business as usual one (681 million of tonnes of CO2e). However, it is
noteworthy to remark that GHG emissions will go down even for the BAU scenario,
which can be explained by the fact that fossil fuels will increase in price and the model
will prioritize less costly energies, which end up being the renewable ones.

2) Results for Germany for Business as Usual Scenario

a) Domestic Production by Energy Type
Below is table 24 that summarizes the results obtained for Germany until 2030 for the
BAU scenario.
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Table 24: Germany Domestic Production by Energy Types in GWh

2015

2020

2025

2030

Solid fuels

500,135.28

500,135.28

500,135.28

500,135.28

Oil

42,055.28

42,055.28

42,055.28

42,055.28

Gas

73,677.22

73,677.22

68,367.12

68,367.12

Hydro Power

20,874.64

18,976.94

16,072.52

16,072.52

Wind power

83,625.55

123,700.43

164,568.72

202,102.78

Solar Thermal and

49,228.23

72,671.43

96,680.70

118,731.18

Solid Biomass

153,582.78

219,076.29

291,454.96

357,928.64

Biogas,

130,976.55

200,806.81

267,149.59

328,079.81

275,358.06

275,358.06

275,358.06

275,358.06

PV

Biogasoline and
Biodiesel
Nuclear heat
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Figure 27: Germany Domestic Production in GWh

As observed from Table 24 and Figure 27, Germany’s domestic production is still
very different from France’s one. Indeed, Germany has a more diversified portfolio, and
will continue to produce fossil fuels and nuclear heat in the future under the BAU
scenario. However, it is important to notice that just as in France’s case, the domestic
production increases for almost all renewable (except hydropower, which decreases the
most) by over 200% of their initial value). Oil, gas and nuclear stay at the same level,
while gas decreases by 7%.

b) Comparison of Cost in Million Dollars under Scenario 1 and 2
Table 25 depicts the comparison of costs between the two scenarios: policy stimulation
and BAU.
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Table 25: Costs under Scenario 1 and 2 in Million Dollars
2015

2020

2025

2030

Scenario 1 (Policy
Stimulation)

803,864.05

743,359.42

916,304.88

721,505.39

Scenario 2
(Business as usual)

803,864.05

827,822.84

848,146.80

874,402.08

Figure 28: Costs under Scenario 1 and 2 in Million Dollars

The trendline in costs is quite different in Germany compared to France. Indeed,
as someone can observe on Figure 28, for the BAU, the cost increases steadily throughout
time, which can be explained by a heavy reliance on fossil fuels, and a difficulty to
switch from them. For the policy stimulation scenario, the cost first decreases, which can
be explained by a drop-in demand, but then increases highly. This is due to the fact that
Germany had a goal for 2020 that was too ambitious, and had to be reduced, meaning that

72

for the year 2025, Germany had to pick up its pace towards GHG targets for 2030,
leading to a higher cost. After that, by 2030, the lower demand, especially in fossil fuel
energies and the availability of renewables leads to lower costs.
c) Comparison of GHG emissions in Million Tonnes of CO2e under Scenario 1 and
2
Table 26 presents the results obtained for GHG emissions under scenario 1 and 2.
Table 26: GHG Emissions under Scenario 1 and 2 in Millions
2015

2020

2025

2030

Scenario 1 (Policy
Stimulation)

2,196.12

1,866.70

1,486.93

1,274.51

Scenario 2
(Business as usual)

2,196.12

2,196.12

2,186.41

2,021.05

Figure 29: GHG Emissions under Scenario 1 and 2
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In terms of GHG emissions, similarly to France, the overall trend for Germany
was also a decreasing one. Indeed, as observable on Figure 29, both scenarios’ emissions
go down between 2015 and 2030. However, for BAU scenario, the GHG emissions are
first more or less stable until 2025, where we can assume that prices for fossil fuels are
too high and the model has no choice but to rely on renewables. For the policy
stimulation case, the GHG emission go down as expected thanks to the constraints, and it
can be seen that the target was too ambitious for 2020, but doable for 2030.

2) Cost of Carbon
Assume that the GHG is reduced from k percent of the 2015 baseline level to l
percent of the 2015 baseline level. The marginal cost of carbon was calculated using the
formula below:
(RL%`a dLb%)

Marginal cost of carbon: (RL%`a '|' ^c#bb#LIb)xyz

xyz

t (RL%`a _Lb%) xy{
t (RL%`a '|' ^c#bb#LIb)xy{

1) Results for Cost of Carbon for France
Below are the results for the cost of carbon scenarios for France.
Table 27: 2015 Cost of Carbon Scenarios France

Marginal Cost
Slack %

GHG in (Thousand

Cost of Energy

of GHG

Tonnes)

Production (Million US$)

Reductions
(US $/tonne)
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100

964,951

497,782

95

916,703

499,694

39.62

90

868,456

522,030

462.94

86

829,858

592,504

1,825.86

Figure 30: 2015 Scenarios for France

As we can observe, in scenarios where the GHG targets are reduced, the total cost
increases exponentially due to the fact that the model forces the choice of renewable
energies over regular fossil fuels. The marginal cost of carbon reduction for the 95%
scenario is $39.62 per ton of CO2e for France, however these costs increase exponentially
for the 90% scenario to $462.94 per ton of CO2e, followed by $1,825.86 per ton of CO2e
for the 86% scenario, making it too costly to be realistically feasible. Additionally, by
reducing GHG emissions, the model will prioritize renewables even if the country
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doesn’t have the infrastructure needed, forcing imports that are 10% more expensive than
domestic production.

2) Results for Cost of Carbon for Germany
Similar scenarios were applied to Germany’s case for 2015 baseline, however the
model was ran for slacks of 100%, 97.5%, 95% and 94.5%, and was not feasible after
that. Following are the results obtained:

Table 28: 2015 Scenarios for Germany

Marginal Cost
Slack %

GHG in (Thousand

Cost of Energy Production

of GHG

Tonnes)

(Million US$)

Reductions
(US $/tonne)

100.00

2,196,117

741,273

97.50

2,141,214

851,148

2,001.26

95.00

2,086,311

961,023

2,001.26

94.50

2,075,331

982,998

2,001.26
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Figure 31: 2015 Scenarios for Germany

As mentioned, prior, Germany’s scenario doesn’t have as much room for slacks as
France’s, and only runs up to 94.5% of the GHG targets. Unlike France, who set a target
for 2020 and 2030, Germany only set their target for 2050, meaning that GHG emissions
levels were linear, explaining the linear trend in the graph as well as the cost of lowering
emissions by a ton. By comparing France and Germany, it becomes evident that Germany
will incur more expenses when it comes to additional GHG mitigation. It is also evident
that Germany has already attained the least cost level for GHG mitigation, while France
can still lower its GHG target before incurring the exponential cost seen on Figure 30.
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CHAPTER 5
5.1 Discussion of the model
As discussed before, advance planning is key to a successful energy transition.
Germany has been one of Europe’s pioneers in the area of energy transition, but its
Energiewiende program was said to be flawed, even with the investments in renewables
and called by some evolutionary rather than revolutionary (Fischer, Hake, Kuckshinrichs,
Schroder and Venghaus, 2016). Additionally, many argue that the true cost of such
transitions is very high due to the number of investments in the renewable sector needed,
while others in favor of the Energiewiende deem that the country would actually make
money when taking in account the environmental factor. Nonetheless, it is important to
note that there is an overall decreasing trend when it comes to GHG emissions for
Germany, even after they pledged to reduce nuclear power. Coal is an important portion
of these emissions, however this resource’s consumption has been decreasing since 1991.
Similarly, France has been working towards reducing its GHG emissions through oil use.
However, these first steps towards an energy transition have proved to be good lessons
for future energy planning, especially in areas of investments for renewable
infrastructure, which can be costly. Both countries have been trying to work hand in hand
in order to coordinate their energy transitions in a more efficient way, towards more
investments in renewables and a decrease of the use of nuclear.
This research first began by analyzing the current 2015 energy portfolio for both
France and Germany, including their domestic production, imports, and sectorial
demands. As mentioned before, these two countries have very different portfolios, when
it comes to both production and consumption. The 2015 data needed in order to be able to
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construct the model, by deriving different supply capacities as well as consumption
patterns. Based on these capacities, the model’s constraints were put in place to modelize
the next years. The model was then run for a policy stimulation scenario, where GHG
targets from the Paris Accord were implemented, followed by a business as usual
scenario, where demand and GHG emissions were kept constant, and lastly a cost of
carbon scenario, where different levels of GHG emissions were applied to the 2015 initial
GHG value.

5.2 Implications for energy transition in France and Germany
When observing the outcomes of the model, it becomes evident that, overall, the
domestic production portfolio of Germany gave it an advantage over France, because of
its diversity. For instance, upon comparing Figures 7 and 16, it is clear that France only
produces certain types of energies, mostly nuclear heat, while Germany manages to have
a minimum level of production in all resources. Nuclear heat, even though a relatively
clean energy, and not very expensive, still raises the issue of safety in many countries,
such as Germany. A debate between the outcome of climate change compared to the
outcome of a possible nuclear accident ensures: is it worth to take the risk of a nuclear
catastrophe such as Chernobyl or Fukushima to mitigate global warming? The nuclear
intense lifestyle leads to two main issues for France. First, not all energy sources used go
towards electricity generation; some are used as a “primary source”, such as oil towards
transportation, or solid fuels for the non-energy sector. However, France mainly produces
nuclear heat, of which the energy can only be harvested through electricity generation,
which leads to the second issue, the question of imports. France currently has to heavily
rely on foreign energy sources for most of its non-electricity, non-nuclear energy needs.
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The need for a shift towards domestically produced renewables is much more crucial and
immediate for France than it is for Germany. For France, it is not only a carbon saving
strategy but also an energy independence strategy. However, it is key to remember that
fossil fuels are still representing a large portion of consumption for both countries, even
by 2030, and despite Germany producing a small portion of them, both countries will be
forced to rely on imports. Rojey, (2009) insists that fossil fuels will still be present, and
actually will play a key role for an energy transition. Furthermore, he insists that the
supply of fossil fuels needs to be diversified in order to avoid geopolitical risks.
We had set supply and demand constraints such that the model generates results
that are consistent with a smooth transition. We kept a minimum level of demand of each
energy type, meaning that even though we try to promote an energy transition, we cannot
expect all demand sectors to avoid fossil fuels and nuclear energy in the short term.
Additionally, it is known that some sectors are more flexible to an energy transition,
while others will take longer to transition. The transportation sector for example, is
expected to take a longer time because there is no economically viable alternative to
replace oil totally, and biofuels, even though are developing, cannot yet cover the total
transportation sector demand. This result was consistent with Price and Keppo (2017) ,
who determined that the transport sector is reliant on oil even when applying different
greenhouse gas emission targets to follow a decarbonization pathway until 2050 and
letting the model increase in cost. In terms of nuclear power, many debates have been
going on throughout the last years, and both countries do have plans to close down their
power plants, as soon as 2022 for Germany (Dromta, 2017). Because of recent nuclear
accidents, as mentioned earlier, many nations have decided to exit from nuclear, but this
energy resource provides a key advantage: it is very low in GHG emissions, as can be
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observed in Table 2. Its cost is also one of the lowest ones, which is another advantage
especially for France and Germany who already have power plants on their territory and
do not have to build them in order to produce energy. Therefore, for this study, it was
decided to keep the nuclear power production capacity at the 2015 levels. However,
slowly, more government bodies could become warmer to the idea of nuclear energy on
their territory as safer and smaller reactors are being made. As Ropeik (2017) mentions,
some policies, such as the Massachusett’s policy, are giving economic incentives towards
nuclear plants in order to meet environmental targets. Although, by design the model did
have too many constraints to operate within, it did have the ability to make finer and
smoother adjustments or shifts between energy sources in each period subject to changes
in energy costs and increasing GHG restrictions.

5.3 Alternative energy scenarios and their cost implications
In terms of cost, it was important to have a comparison in order to evaluate how
an energy transition would impact not only the environment, but also the economic costs
of achieving such a transition. However, putting a price on energy and its impact on the
environment is quite difficult. Indeed, within this research, price was set in terms of cost
per GWh generated. Despite that, no tax of carbon was put in place, but such a set-up is
possible if wanted within the model in order to estimate new total cost. Carbon taxes are
useful tools in order to control the use of high carbon emission technologies and could
cost effectively reduce GHG emissions. Both France and Germany have implemented
such laws, but their effects are different. For Germany, the ecological tax reform could be
considered as a success, since it reduced GHG emissions and also created jobs. For
France, on the other hand, government tried to implement a carbon tax that would
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increase in amount every year on oil, gas and coal. This tax affects both the business and
residential sectors, therefore creating a lot of opposition, and after a long time of protest
by the yellow jackets, the idea of increasing carbon taxes was put aside. However, even
without the application of any carbon taxes, this model is a useful one in order to estimate
overall total costs incurred by the two countries while transitioning to greener energies.
As Trutnevyte ( 2016) points out, cost optimization models are usually adapted in
order to present energy scenarios for policy makers. These models end up being
simplified versions with varied constraints of the real-world situation. Different
constraints dictate the outcomes of these energy scenarios, hence why we decided to
conduct two different scenarios in this research: one where we implement the targeted
GHG levels and future demand called policy stimulation, and one where these GHG
levels and demands were kept at the 2015 level (BAU scenario). It is evident that the
policy stimulation scenario not only mitigates GHG emissions, but also is more
economically beneficial for both countries, as can be observed in Figure 25 for France
and Figure 28 for Germany. This is due to the fact that overall demand decreases for the
policy stimulation case, while it does not for the baseline scenario, and also the fact that
in the baseline scenario, fossil fuels are still at the same level in terms of demand, while
cost increases. This forces the model to pick a minimum amount of fossil fuels,
increasing therefore the overall cost as these fossil fuels increase in price at a 2% yearly
rate. For both countries, since demand is higher than supply for fossil fuels, the model
calls for importing these resources, which adds another 10% to the cost. Similarly, GHG
emissions are much higher in the BAU scenario, wherein we do not force the model to
constraint these emissions. However, we do see a downward trend for GHG emissions for
the BAU scenario as for the policy scenario. This is due to the fact that fossil fuels
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become expensive over the years due to the expected cost inflation, and while renewables
do experience improving cost advantages due to the expected technological
improvements, the model is forced to pick renewables to minimize the total costs. Price
and Keppo (2017) have also implemented two similar scenarios, one being a business as
usual, and the other one a climate policy run. For these scenarios, different slacks were
applied to account for cost, and what is found is that coal and gas are easily substituted
while oil is present even at higher costs, and non-biomass renewables’ present an
asymmetric behavior. The research also mentions energy distribution: what is used in
order to produce electricity or what goes to other demand sectors such as transportation,
and how this distribution affects the overall system. Some energies, such as coal, are used
only for power generation, while others, like gas, can be used by other demand sectors.
One of the important policy relevant question is if both countries are already at
the lowest cost GHG target possible, or could they still reduce their targets without facing
high expenses? As observed from Figures 30 and 31, which show the cost at different
levels of percent reductions from the 2015 total GHG emissions, the trends for France
and Germany are very different. Indeed, Germany shows a steady and linear increase in
cost, while France first deals with a linear and then an exponential increase. Similarly,
when observing Tables 24 and 25, the cost of removing one tonne of CO2 for France first
starts low at $39.62 and then increases drastically, while it stays constant for Germany.
This can be explained by the fact that Germany is already at its lowest cost optimal GHG
emission target, while France has still some room to decrease this target by five to eight
percent, without having to experience drastic increase in costs. Beyond this five to eight
percent reduction levels, France’s energy production cost would go up substantially. This
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is also confirmed by the fact that the model was running up to the 86% level for France,
while it could only run to a 94.5% level for Germany.

84

CHAPTER 6
6 Conclusion
This research demonstrates that an energy transition is economically viable for
both France and Germany. These two countries are not only leaders of the European
Union, but also have two of the highest GDPs in the region, and therefore could be
perfect examples to promote stable and planned energy transitions. The Paris Accord
allows each nation to determine its own pace for energy transition and GHG reductions.
Germany has set very ambitious goals for its GHG emissions, while France followed a
more general European path. In this study, we find that given the current national energy
demands of various sectors and its available domestic supply capacities, Germany may
not be able to meet its 2020 GHG emission target and will need to revisit its goals to be
more realistic. We were able to run the model for feasible results only after we lowered
the emission reduction targets. This shows more drastic energy transition planning would
be necessary for Germany if it were to accomplish its nationally determined energy
transition goal under the Paris Accord.
The decision taken by Germany following the Fukushima accident to leave the
nuclear industry is one that arises many debated. This initiative raises the question of the
future of nuclear power and spreads the idea of a phase out to multiple other countries
including France. Such a decision has consequences not only at the national level, but
also at the European one. When speaking about energy transition, at least in terms of
electricity production, it is a common mistake to believe that the development of solar
and wind power would act as a substitute to the production of nuclear power. These two
renewable energies are considered to be intermittent, meaning that they produce power at

85

random periods of time, in other words only when sun and wind are present. However,
there is not yet technology that would allow to store the produced electricity in an
efficient and inexpensive manner, meaning that the grid is unable to provide power to
demand in any weather condition, season or even time of the day. Therefore, there is a
need to possess also controllable production capacities that are not affected by the
problem of intermittence, such as coal, gas, nuclear or even hydroelectric in order to
provide a constant supply of electricity. It is known that nuclear possesses low GHG
coefficients, however still took the decision to phase out that technology. The question is
if such a path is realistic. Germany is a good example to illustrate the option of phasing
out nuclear. Two options are possible in order to deal with the issue. In order to still meet
its energy demand while closing down nuclear plants, Germany invested in more solar
energy, wind poser, but also more gas plants, which are, not so ecologically friendly, but
also dependent on gas that is a non-renewable and limited energy. Therefore, Germany is
only taking steps back instead of promoting their so-called transition. The second option
to eventually close down power plants is to reduce demand through efficiency and
conservation practices. However, even if these practices are implemented, is it really a
smart move to close down technologies that can produce large amounts of electricity at
low GHG levels? France has been pushing the use of renewables, but however is still
undecisive when it comes to the question of phasing out nuclear. The government put
forward the idea of closing nuclear reactors by 2035 in order to reduce the share of
nuclear to 50% of the electricity mix by 2035, but once again, this means having to
compensate with fossil fuels since renewables are not expanded enough to cover the
demand.
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The topic of energy transition has become an important political issue for many
reasons, including climatic problems, public health issues, higher energy costs and
economic growth. The low-carbon energy transition debate has brought a number of
issues and challenges to attention. First, promoting this energy transition needs to
promote building wind turbines and solar panels, the technology of which still needs
improvements. These energy types are expected to grow in the future years, but are still
not fully competitive with other energy resources. Additionally, for many citizens, seeing
PV panels or wind turbines is not pleasant, therefore having to build offshore wind
turbines might be a good solution for France, but not so much for Germany. On top of
that, these renewable resources still hold the issue of intermittence: no large-scale storage
technology is yet developed in order to store energy produced by renewables for future
use. Second, the energy transition needs to address challenges such as access to energy,
widening gap between production and consumption, and the price and cost of domestic
energy production. The two countries explored in this study are part of the developed
world, and share a border meaning that access to electricity is more common than other
places in the world. Therefore, when living in these two leading European countries, it
can be quickly forgotten that not all humans have an equal access to energy. The
development of renewable energy, as well as a decrease in the cost of infrastructure could
lead to more access to electricity. Further, the development of these renewable energies
as well as their storage would help to breach the gap between production levels and
consumption levels. Third, politics also plays an incredible role in energy transitions.
Even though local responses can be different from country to country, energy policy
developments usually orbit around certain common goals: energy security, social equity,
access to energy and cost efficiency. Both countries have been trying to implement
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different policies when it comes to the environment and an energy transition. But were
these as successful as we would expect? The debate is one that provokes a lot of heat, and
at the end of the day the decision is not always about the environment or how to slow
down climate change, but more about who will have to pay the price for such a transition.
The model developed in this study, even though only theoretical, provides a broad
framework to evaluate some of these issues at the national level while setting energy and
carbon targets and considering technological advances in energy production. However, an
important portion that was left out was the impact of trade on these different mixes, in
particular the effect of exports. This study only took in account imports, since no
information about export destination was found, and therefore no relation between France
and Germany in terms of energy supply was performed. This information would have
been interesting to include within the research, as both countries share a border, and are
known to trade electricity as well as other energy supplies. In this study, it is confirmed
that reaching the Paris Accord targets is realistic, and that a smooth transition can be put
in place in order to guarantee a durable result.
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